Part 4. Read also the first, second and third parts.


“If the second law of thermodynamics is true (and it is true) and entropy cannot decrease and disappear, then the question arises (a rather disturbing question ) - where is it in this case? When order was put in place, what happened to the disorder? Where is the chaos now, which seems to be nowhere to be seen? Where did it go? In what places does it now grow (after all, “according to the law” it must grow!)?” Surkov asked.

It should be noted that in an objective analytical assessment, the Russian order is neither order nor chaos. It is a kind of third state, which would be correct to describe the word "mess" (for sure, I'm not the first to notice this :)).

"Mess" is fundamentally different from chaos in that it is usually conditionally ordered in someone's "muddy" ("muddy" in different ways, but always vicious - out of laziness, out of stupidity, out of greed, pride for the sake of etc) interests . And that is why it does not leave Russia, despite Surkov's illusions. It grows in hands, in brains. Therefore, always and everywhere it is with you."

The mess is extremely poorly organized for creative purposes. In a mess, you can't just do whatever you want. With it, only the action leading to degradation is effective (supported by the environment), down, “on an inclined plane”. Any effort to move backwards will be sabotaged and stalled on the 2nd, 3rd, 4th iteration.

But the "mess" is not the order, either. The “muddy” interest is muddy because it distorts, neglects the interests of any ecosystem where it is built. Metaphorically, it's like taking Tolkien's elf, pouring over ... some kind of "black magic" and getting an orc. "Mess" ignores any sound systems with their balance of interests so much that it is fundamentally inconsistent with anything constructive . And, therefore, from the point of view of such a system, it constantly produces crap.

Over some practical consequences, the internet caustically sneers.

For example... When, against the backdrop of an unsuccessful war, an article appeared in the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation on "public actions aimed at discrediting the armed forces", suggesting a fine and even a criminal offense, the internet caustically commented:

The Russian army was fined for discrediting the Russian army.

Another good example is the enchanting statements by Minister Lavrov about Jewish anti-Semitism and the subsequent “aggravating” statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry about the course of the current government of Israel to support the neo-Nazi regime in Kyiv. After that, the emperor personally had to apologize to the Prime Minister of Israel. Everything is "beautiful" here. And chaos cannot make it. For chaos to make anything like this, millions of years of excrement ... experiments are needed. But it is possible for an interested mess, against the background of the encouraged "devastation in the heads".

So... The pre-war Surkov finds a "brilliant" thermodynamic move - precisely in the spirit of a selfish mess, not chaos:

“All empires do it. For centuries, the Russian state, with its harsh and inactive political interior, was preserved solely thanks to the relentless striving beyond its own borders. It has long forgotten how, and most likely, never knew how to survive in other ways. For Russia, constant expansion is not just one of the ideas, but the true existential of our historical existence.

Imperial technology is still effective today, with empires renamed superpowers. The Crimean consensus is a vivid example of the consolidation of society due to the chaos of a neighboring country .”

The saying you cannot teach old dogs new tricks comes to mind - old dogs cannot be taught new tricks. Even if the level of threats grows or goes off scale.

When the "severe and inactive political interior" cannot even be called into question, the famous "they steal" of Karamzin cannot be called into question. This means that the main real, and not imaginary, centuries-old enemy and destroyer of Russia ceases to be identifiable. Corruption turns into a glue that really holds the whole structure of shit and sticks together, into the main instrument of foreign and domestic policy. Which turns this policy into eternally yesterday 's in the information world striving for ever greater transparency.

I think it would be appropriate here to quote a paragraph from Sergei Datsyuk's article " What happens in the limit state ?" :

“It was not possible to find a description of the transistential uncertainty, which is more terrible than the existential one – “it is better to die than to change, for change brings a more terrible uncertainty than death” , could not be found anywhere except in religious texts. The creature most often prefers to die rather than be transformed .”

This is precisely the dilemma facing the Russian elites (perhaps Russia as a whole).

The current global scale of Russia's exports of fear fully reflects the degree and scope of the fear of its own elites, who are unable to change. Ukraine, which was trying to break into NATO (I repeat, it is not superfluous), seemed to these elites an object that significantly complicates an already unacceptably complex environment corroded by total theft, shaky environment.

By the way, the internal Russian opposition seemed to be the same object . When it was suppressed and the West swallowed it, it seemed to the Kremlin that the trick could be repeated with Ukraine.


The increasingly total rollback of Russian propaganda and other spheres and practices to, in fact, Soviet stamps and models of many decades ago, deserves special attention, taking place against the backdrop of the war. It clearly demonstrates the degree of elite confusion, zero creativity and total semantic emptiness. In psychological terms, this is regression. Rollback in a situation of anxiety or conflict to less mature and appropriate behaviors.

After all, the USSR lost the competition already in the last century. What to say about the current century?

If you look today at the footage from the times of the State Emergency Committee, you might get the impression that the late USSR was ruled by idiots. And what idiots advised them too. But it's not. The USSR had powerful intellectual structures. But they worked in an exceptionally narrow corridor of what was permitted. This ruined all humanitarian thought in the USSR (technical thought had more freedom and the difference in results 30 years ago was clearly visible).

The more pocket and blinkered the intellectuals, the more useless their recommendations . In the end, relying on pocket intellectuals for power inevitably loses feedback. In the modern world, this is akin to trying to steer on a winding highway, at increasing speeds, blindfolded. Or racing through the dark night with headlights that shine inwards - giving you the luxury of bathing in the spotlights. But until the next turn or pillar.

What is happening is all the more strange because (I will allow myself one more quote from my previously mentioned article many years ago):

“There is a fundamental ideological difference between the USSR and modern Russia, which gives rise to an insoluble contradiction .

They tried to build the USSR on the ideas of Marx, which are "involved" in labor, and not in carving up. The Soviet Union, obliquely and crookedly - but created. And therefore, albeit formally, in every possible way promoted the idea of ​​creation leading to a brighter future. Since this "future" was supposed to come, Soviet propaganda was more cautious than Russian propaganda in threatening to turn America "into radioactive ashes" or drop a "nuclear bomb into the Bosphorus."

Moreover, it was not only about the collective bright future, but also about the personal one. Not always, but quite often, labor in the USSR paid off. Basically, the written dissertation, the received rank, the next military rank, and the like paid off.

In post-Soviet times, this was practically over. In the country of extraction, kickbacks and scammers, labor has ceased to be a "good strategy."

In this sense, the mythical "Soviet Union", allegedly revived by Putin and Co., differs from the real USSR like a candy wrapper. This is an attempt to inflate to the limits of what was created and, for a rather short time, supported by completely different meanings . Today's Russia of such a scale does not contain meanings.

A strange paradox has arisen. The ideas promoted by the Bolsheviks occupied Russian television and scraps of the Internet environment, Lenin supporting the “obscene” Brest Peace marches on the pedestals of the temporarily occupied part of the South of Ukraine. And even the Kremlin's top propagandist, Surkov's classmate Vladimir Solovyov, who suddenly pulled on a military uniform so that he would come for glory to Mariupol, did not forget to hang out at the camera at the entrance of Ilyich's plant, which had been gouged by the Russians.

Despite the fact that it was under Lenin, "in the 17-18 years of the last century", according to Surkov, "the collapse of Russia" began.

But Ilyich and applied recommunization are striding so broadly through the Russian ideological vacuum, as if they set out to complete what they started more than a century ago. As if it remains only to wait until the notorious corrupt oligarchic basis and the Bolshevik superstructure come into conflict so completely that everything collapses under the weight of property and cognitive dissonance that is unbearable for the Russian masses.

This is strange for another reason. While the special services are well fed from the Russian economy and the proportion of people from the special services in significant positions and streams is huge (the figure sounded - up to 70%), this cannot be said about the army.

The Russian army has fairly advanced weapons, but the Russian soldier is fed, equipped, supplied and organized badly. If you add to the picture the typical, i.e. very grassroots, origin of the average Russian fighter, the communist idea appears to be a cigarette butt that is thrown ... Wherever they just throw it. On the Web, they ironically say that “the most terrible weapon is a cigarette butt: it will burn down the oil depot, and blow up the arsenal, and sink the cruiser, and derail the train . ” Even more, even more.

In general, one gets the impression that, having started the war, Russia was never able to recapture the Donbass, but ended up being occupied by ORDLO . A little more and it will come to the ideological occupation of Russia by the DPRK.

The problem for Russians is that Russia is not North Korea. Russia is a multinational state with more than a hundred times the territory and vast length of borders. Russia is inevitably involved in a huge number of modern international processes. Russia competes in global markets, where market conditions alone do not always export. The country is dealing with colossally modernized neighbors. And therefore , he cannot afford to use models of 90-100 years ago. China, for example, did not even remain China half a century ago (which for it is a historical minuscule), a country of the times of Mao . And that is what led him to second place in the current world championship.

You can dream as much as you like about self-sufficiency, import substitution, etc. But the ongoing primitivization, archaization and militarization of consciousness are leading Russia to collapse. The impulse of war is the uprising of the destructive. This is the call of the death instinct . And every day of the war, and even more so, its transition to new levels - the steps of awakening this instinct. It doesn't care what to destroy.


Returning to the plot with a possible quasi-mobilization in the DPRK. In Russia, a century ago, real mobilization turned into a revolution. But the Russian elites have so isolated themselves from reality, so obscured the First World War with the myth of the Great Victory, that they forgot about its dramatic results.

Yes, history did not repeat itself during World War II in the USSR. But not because of the strength of the repressive apparatus (which is what Russia is trying to respond to today's challenges) - just during the war it lost its former strength and the former scale of repression became unrealistic.

There was no revolution in the USSR, because there was no flagrant inequality that gave rise to revolution . Today's Russia, in terms of inequality, has caught up with and surpassed "pre-revolutionary" Russia . Whereas the Russian society is much less tolerant of inequality than, say, the American one. There, as in the famous western "The Good, the Bad, the Ugly," the plot revolves around the one in whose hands the gun is. The words of the classic about the Russian rebellion are still relevant. And the armed lumpen doesn't care what to smash and where to rob - in Irpen or Khamovniki. There would be a suitable case and background, but there will be a fan.

You can, in a closed society, for the time being, suppress the anti-war movement. But if closeness is accompanied by blatant inequality, you can't do anything about class hatred.

The resigned townsfolk munching chips in front of the TV are not hundreds of thousands of embittered soldiers from the trenches, who also stole mountains of weapons . The elites can despise a soldier solely because he allows it to be done and exactly until the moment he allows it to be done. The rifle (inevitably) gives birth to power, as the classic of the greatest of revolutions observed.

Mobilization (as opposed to calling up reservists) is a decision of the elites, leading to an increase in losses at times. Because the scale and / or duration (in any case, the severity) of the conflict is growing many times. Besides, people ill-prepared or ill-intended for war are easy targets. This means losses are even steeper.

Sun Tzu said: “In the war they heard about success with its speed, even with its inept conduct, and have not yet seen success with its duration, even with its skillful conduct. It has never happened before that the war lasted for a long time and this would be beneficial to the state .”

Exhausting, lasting and lasting, bloody war unequivocally and inevitably drives a wedge between the interests of the top and the bottom . Cream of society and "deep" roots. What cannot be compensated by brave speeches and pictures with Solovyov-Simonyan or propaganda in the Telega .

“If our soldiers understood why we are fighting, it would be impossible to wage a
single war,” said Frederick the Great.

The elites wage wars for the sake of ambitions, status, lands, etc. What they consider to be a
priority compared to human lives and destinies, with which this whole banquet is generously paid. The burden of losses is almost entirely shifted to the lower classes of society. It is growing and expanding rapidly, which the elites
do not feel and are poorly aware of (because they do not suffer comparable losses, but they can collect cream). At some point, the situation reverses. Sectors of society that have suffered huge losses demand satisfaction. Equally
large-scale bloody uprisings or revolutions break out.

The other day, Speaker of the State Duma of the Russian Federation Vyacheslav Volodin announced that there
would be no mobilization. Sudden burst of self-preservation instinct of the elites.

The second surge - a nuclear strike is considered "only as an opportunity to respond to the strike." True, Volodin did not specify that the strike against Russia should also be nuclear. Therefore, it is too early to rejoice at a glimmer of common sense in the echoing corridors of Russian power. But the awareness of the growing precariousness of the social situation with the growth of the scale of the exchange of blows to the tower and the bins, high above the people, the officials of the Russian Federation, who were placed high above the people, seems to have looked.


“By crossing the Halys River, you will destroy a great empire,” the oracle allegedly announced to
Croesus before the war with Cyrus. Croesus moved on. Everyone knows how it ended.
It is no coincidence that wars have destroyed so many empires. It is no coincidence that both in the First World War
and in the Second World War the more flexible ones won, while the more militarized ones lost, collapsed, and were blown to pieces.

Calling for the export of chaos, calling to cross the “Halys River”, pre-war Surkov forgot to ask a couple of questions: “What will happen if the export of chaos begins in the opposite direction? How will the “Russian state with its harsh and sedentary political interior” react to such exports ? What will happen to this state in case of failure in a big war, if "it has long forgotten how, and most likely never knew how to survive in other ways?"