Vladimir Putin's ultimatums to Ukraine and the West naturally raise the question of how effectively one can respond to Russia's threats.
In a new conversation between Yuri Romanenko and philosopher Serhiy Datsyuk, it is shown why Ukraine's hopes for NATO as a tool to contain Russia are groundless, how the logic of a nuclear strike has transformed, and what can be opposed to Russia.
Hello everyone! Our guest is Serhiy Datsyuk. We will talk about our fears in the context of the international situation around Ukraine.
The day before yesterday, negotiations ended between Russia and the United States, where Ukraine occupied a significant part of the negotiation process. Although you need to understand that in fact the United States and Russia spoke about their interests and about their influence in the world, where Ukraine is just a component, but one of important components.
Ukraine today is such a knot, the denouement of which will largely determine how the architecture of the world order will take shape in the coming decades.
It will not untie immediately, this is understandable, it will take years, maybe more than one year. But it is obvious that we must understand what motives move the players who play, including in Ukraine.
Because Sergei Ryabkov, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, shook the air with threats in the same way that Putin had done before. Moreover, with threats that persons in their right mind would not make: about the war, about the fact that we will apply some kind of military-technical measures, or military measures. If you are wrong, then we will take military-technical measures, you must yield to us, etc.
On the other hand, we are well aware that Ryabkov, and Putin, and Lavrov say all these threats, while remaining sane from the point of view of psychiatry. Therefore, it is obvious that such a projection of fear, which comes from these messages, is rational. They use it to achieve their goals.
Accordingly, the question arises - what can a knowingly weaker subject, such as Ukraine, for example, oppose to this?
Well, the subject is not stronger or weaker: it either is or it is not. And in this sense, when you say “we must understand,” then I have such a purely cognitive interest, and where this understanding should be located.
When you say "we must understand". We will discuss with you, we will understand something. Will this somehow affect, relatively speaking, Ukraine's strategy to change its policy? That is, if we understand, somewhere it should be fixed. Or, another important question - what is the unit of understanding?
Look, we have changed our geopolitical attitude twice in 30 years. We changed it for the first time in the early 1990s, when we wrote in the Declaration of Independence that we are a neutral, non-bloc state. The second time we changed it was when we wrote in the Constitution that our course is towards the EU and NATO.
In both cases, we changed it non-reflexively. It is impossible to find a certain document which says that we came to this conclusion as a result of a brainstorming session or a national round table. There are no certain units of understanding:articles, books, studies, scenarios, models, which led to change of the orientation of our country " from ... to ... ".
Therefore, what guided the people who wrote NATO and the EU into the Constitution? What were they guided by? Can you find it somewhere? Not in my interpretation. In retrospect, I can roll back and I can tell what they were guided by.
The same goes for neutrality.
Nothing. They acted reactively. So Putin began to fight, he took away Crimea, which means they went to NATO and the EU, because it’s not good here. Look, so an important question arises - what is the unit of understanding? The unit of understanding in this case is a reflexive model, or a set of reflexive models.
For example, the first model is a model of peaceful life, where we describe what kind of relations we have with Europe, what kind of relations with Russia, how we make friends, with whom, against whom, with whom is energy, with which energy carriers, with whom is metallurgy, with whom is cultural policy, what cultural policy, what language, whose language, why and how. That is, we write everything down.
The second reflexive model is how we act in situations of military threat, conventional weapons, loss, territory, etc.
The third reflexive model is how we act in case of a nuclear threat. And these things cannot be compared.
To be clear, there are fundamentally two different military policies. It would seem that there is a war, and there is some military policy in it - nothing like that. There is a military policy of conventional weapons, including even chemical and bacteriological weapons. And there is the military policy of nuclear war.
These are two different policies. They have a different concept, different visions, they use thinking and reflection in different ways. Why? Because no matter how they tell us that war is bad, the world has survived more than one war, after the war they restored the economy, and demography moves like this, then the war, it returns to the point as if nothing had happened and moves on. Well, war does not affect humanity in any way, nor demographics, and the economy is being rebuilt and continues, nothing was difficult.
But nuclear war is the ultimate thing, there are fundamentally different principles of vision, laws, concepts. There is a basic question of understanding - when will we join NATO, what will it mean in terms of conventional war and what will it mean in terms of nuclear war, and where can you find out about it. Is there a place where you would go, sign that you stand for Ukraine, that you all your parents, grandfathers and great-grandfathers are Ukrainians and that you are not plotting anything bad, would you get permission and read it?
Well, thank God, I communicate with those people who still chat and say that there is nothing of this anywhere. There is no idea in principle of a reflexive model of what we do when NATO is here.
It would seem that we are somehow changing public opinion in the country about NATO. I ask people so carefully: tell me, do you want to join NATO, but tell me, have you read the charter? How many articles are there, what is the 5th article about, what is the 6th article about. At least inquired? Well, for example, the word "nuclear" is not a weapon, but simply "nuclear" in the NATO Charter does not occur.
The fifth article says the following, that if there is an attack on one of the NATO members, then everyone will consider it an attack on everyone, and they will try to help somehow to the best of their powers and ability. It does not say that they will join the war, that they will help with resources (so, they must - Yuri Romanenko).
Moreover, nowhere in publicly available NATO documents are there any reflexive strategies for dealing with nuclear war. Actually, that's why no one there, neither China, nor Russia, is trying to negotiate with NATO. Why?
It turns out that the principle of mutually assured destruction has only bilateral relations. To be clear. If the owner of nuclear weapons A and the owner of nuclear weapons B can attack each other in a nuclear way, by nuclear war, then the reverse answer is that they will destroy each other mutually. The question arises - but this is the relationship between A and B, can it be transferred, say, to participant C?
Slovakia, for example. Slovakia is a member of NATO.
Can it be transferred to Ukraine, the Baltic countries? It turns out not. Why? And because there is no guaranteed destruction. No matter how many US missiles are placed on Ukrainian territory as a result of Ukraine's accession to NATO, we cannot guarantee the destruction of Russia. No way. This is the first moment.
The second point - when placing missiles here, the button will not be with us.
The third point is even if nuclear weapons are used to protect our territory of Ukraine... We say that Russia attacked us, we ask to use nuclear weapons against it. Fine! They push the button, rockets take off from here, do some damage to Russia. Where do rockets fly back to? Here. Well, there is no reason to strike at America. That's what we asked for. We are to blame.
Rockets are coming here. That is, the complete destruction of Ukraine can only be carried out by Russia, but not by us. The question arises - are these all reflexive models generally calculated? Well, for example, what is the reflexive model of the Caribbean crisis. Who won the Cuban Missile Crisis? THE USSR. Why? Because it improved its situation. Before the Caribbean crisis, there were nuclear missiles in Turkey; after the Caribbean crisis, they were taken out from Turkey. Why, if the principle of mutually assured destruction applies?
It turns out that the principle did not adequately describe this situation. A fundamentally new idea arose during the Caribbean crisis. This is the so-called "unacceptable damage". The USSR won in the situation of confrontation in the Cuban missile crisis, because they used a vague or little recognized idea of unacceptable damage at the time.
What is Unacceptable Damage? Unacceptable damage is that damage that you cannot accept under any circumstances, under any circumstances. This unacceptable damage has a special property: it is the greater, or its threshold, the less, the richer you are.
Let's say, for America, a blow to any city is unacceptable, because rich people live there, they value their lives, their capital, and they elected the federal government, it should be responsible for them. Therefore, the damage to any city for America is unacceptable.
But with respect to Russia as a continuing collective idea... There was a collective idea in the USSR, and now, by and large, it has been preserved. Russia has only two unacceptable damages: St. Petersburg and Moscow. All other damage for Russia is acceptable.
Of course, you won’t read about it in public publications, experts won’t tell you about it, you won’t find out about it if you read the Internet. What is this knowledge? This is expert knowledge. It is calculated by analyzing and observing the situation.
We used to think that when we are fighting in the Donbas, and coffins go to Russia from the Donbas, this will be unacceptable damage. Russia is tolerant of this damage. It uses propaganda, pays off everything, shuts everybody up, acts by means of violence, police and other things. That is, for Russia, this damage is not unacceptable.
For us, for Ukraine, even the threat of a nuclear attack is unacceptable damage. Not an attack, but a threat. Why? Because it worsens the political situation, leads to non-election...
Why did Ukraine lose Crimea? Where do you read the analysis of this situation? I am literally the only one in the country who has publicly attempted to raise this issue. Until now, no one wants to answer this question. The situation of nuclear blackmail took place in the loss of Crimea by Ukraine. Nobody wants to talk about it.
The media has come up with the information why. That Putin called Merkel and said they would launch a nuclear strike on Ukraine…
I am aware that it happened, I know. I researched, I wondered. I say that in Ukraine no one wants to recognize.
You understand, we are trying to make a geopolitical choice, and not a single politician has publicly analyzed the situation with Crimea. Nowhere was it publicly said that yes, we were acting in a situation of nuclear blackmail, so that's it. Nobody wants to say it.
There should be some kind of parliamentary commission that would conduct an investigation and state that, yes…
The investigation built a reflective model of whether it was possible to act differently in a situation of nuclear blackmail. A reflexive model has not been built, as you say, understanding has not appeared, therefore we cannot talk about what we will do - simply understanding has not arisen. Let's go ahead.
So, we have established that unacceptable damage is when you cannot agree with it under any circumstances. For Russia, it is very small: St. Petersburg and Moscow, all other damage is acceptable. Now look, let's take the concept of mutual destruction, not transitive, not transferred to a third party, take the concept of unacceptable damage, and take, for example, some Baltic state, which seems to be in NATO.
Russia sends its troops to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania - it doesn't matter where it enters. NATO troops begin to oppose it. Russia uses tactical nuclear weapons. After the use of tactical nuclear weapons, the United States in response, or another NATO member state, cannot use strategic nuclear weapons, because it would look like exceeding the limits of necessary defense - there is such a thing. This means they can only use tactical nuclear weapons in response.
Okay, they are using tactical nuclear weapons against Russia, which has previously used tactical nuclear weapons against troop concentrations. For the Baltic countries, the use of tactical nuclear weapons is like one strategic charge. The war with the use of tactical nuclear weapons actually puts an end to this country.
Everyone sees it. After that, Putin calmly enters any next Baltic state, and everyone understands that either an occupation, as it were, or complete destruction. Look, a simple reflexive model shows that even if you are a member of NATO, this does not hold water when it comes to nuclear war or the use of nuclear weapons.
Now back to Ukraine. Any damage to Ukraine, which is rich enough, liberal enough, is unacceptable for us. We cannot take this damage as an accepted. Accordingly, the use of any ammunition, whether tactical or strategic, does not matter, it destroys the political situation, and the situation of confrontation is actually catastrophic. The use of any nuclear weapon leads to unpredictable domestic political consequences: splits, disengagement, confrontation.
What can we do to raise the threshold for Russia to make, for example, a strike on other Russian cities unacceptable. To do this, it is necessary to support the liberals in Russia. To do this, you need to have your own Russian diaspora, for this you need to have your own Russian channels, for this you need to establish contacts with the liberals of Russia. What have we done? We said that the most important thing for us is the Ukrainian language, wearing an embroidered shirt, and walking with torches...
In the comments they immediately write to you “how liberals will help”.
Liberals are the only ones who can make or create the notion that any damage is unacceptable. Now Putin will be worried in case of St. Petersburg or Moscow attack, in all other cases it doesn’t matter. He proved it in the Donbas.
He can be worried when there is pressure from the liberals, who will say that Voronezh, Murmansk, and Vladivostok, a blow to them is equally unacceptable. Only liberals can come out with this agenda and keep it, and prove it.
What is Putin doing inside his strategy. That's right, in every possible way he restricts the liberals. He understands that only they can make problems for him, i.e. make any damage unacceptable, deprive him of maneuver. And now he has the widest maneuver in the world, he can ignore any losses and can really put all of Russia at stake except for St. Petersburg and Moscow. That's why his acting is so brazen.
The last thing I read today is that the States have publicly proposed to Sweden and Finland to join NATO.
Not publicly, they said a little differently. They said that if Sweden and Finland have such a desire, the States are ready to consider it.
I translate into normal language so that it is clear. Are you worried about flight time from Ukraine, Putin? And count the flying time from Finland and Sweden. Okay, let's leave Ukraine alone, count. They are trying to show that Ukraine is not the only way to minimize flight time.
This is actually such an exchange of diplomatic messages. The Russians say we are conducting military exercises...
And, yes, we invite Sweden and Finland to NATO. You, Putin, please, count the flight time. What do you get there? Less than 5 minutes, right? Well, you get it, right? It's a conversation at that level.
And in fact, we are talking about the fact that the concept of the vision of nuclear war is seriously changing. Especially in the situation of hypersonic missile weapons, or hypersonic missile delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. In fact, hypersonic weapons fundamentally change the idea of flight time, of the admissibility/inadmissibility of a strategic strike, because at such speeds you just need to press a button and this is it. And only systems like the "Dead hand" can answer you.
Even in the event of the complete destruction of the state, an automatic system is being created that, without receiving a response from certain control centers, delivers an automatic retaliation strike. And with hypersonic weapons, this becomes especially relevant.
Here is a conventionally zombie hand, or a dead hand. You have already killed the state, but even after death it answers you in such a way that you will not survive. And this fundamentally changes the view. That is, we must switch to such reflexive representations.
But such reflexive notions mean that this is not a NATO issue, it is not even a matter of relations with the United States, since mutually assured destruction is not transitive, it does not transfer to third countries. And this is not a question of the acceptability or unacceptability of damage - this is a question of how we build our policy.
We have a trump card, or rather two or three trump cards up our sleeve, which will make the enemy think whether it is worth messing with us? What do we have? It turns out that there is nothing like that, we have not purchased. We didn't think so. We did not build such systems of understanding.
This raises the question - did those who made decisions about joining NATO even calculate all these things? Well, let's join NATO, what's next? Will it protect us from a nuclear attack? No, we cannot cause irreparable nuclear damage in any way, even if there are American missiles here, and they still have the button. It still destroys us.
Then what's the point? Then what is the point of joining NATO? Will it fit in for us in an ordinary war? As practice shows, this does not happen. Because article 5 of the charter says that yes, countries will accept those measures, or will act as they consider relevant. That is, there is no obligation in Article 5.
Just go and read this 5th article. It does not say that if attacked, then you should fight, no. You must provide the assistance needed. It could be any help. It can be a consultation, an expression of concern, a weapon…
By the way, there were precedents. Let's remember November 30, 2015, when the Turks shot down a Russian plane. In fact, it also invaded the airspace of Turkey, a NATO member. The Turks made appropriate requests regarding this and they clearly received a response from the Europeans that they would do nothing. This was one of the reasons that forced Erdogan to change the trajectory. Six months later, there was an attempted military coup, and Putin still fussed there, helped Erdogan with information.
What would I like, how would I see. In my opinion, for several months now, the Institute for Strategic Studies should have been working on scenarios for a conventional war: with the use of aviation, without the use of aviation, with missile strikes, with attacks on infrastructure, with attacks on the Internet and mobile communications, with strikes on energy, with strikes on nuclear stations.
It should have already worked on this, building reflective models of what we really get when joining NATO, what joining NATO looks like in a situation of nuclear war. Where is it all?! Well, I understand, you can always say: it's all top secret.
I made inquiries, tell me, but these top secret scenarios, do they exist? They sighed heavily and said to me: well, of course, there are some sketches. And with these sketches, we are trying to make a vital decision for us.
I can imagine this situation. Zelensky says like this: what do we have, bring it. There are sketches. A bunch of sketches posted. What's this? Sketches. Take a look.
There is not a single reflexive model in which Ukraine wins when joining NATO in a situation not only of strategic, but of the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
The comment appears: Sergei, so what, you want to say that our movement into the Euro-Atlantic world is a madness that does not make any sense?
If you haven't read it, you can tell. I want to say. I've been saying this non-stop since 2010. I was following this line contantly, I can show specific articles where I wrote this. Even on the eve of the revolution, I wrote that we need neither NATO nor the EU, because this does not solve any of the problems. The frontier state cannot be protected in this way.
In a situation of ordinary war, when you are building strategies, reflection is enough for you. Reflection is such a thing that even if you don’t have it, if you were brought up in a family without reflection, don't be afraid. There are methodological communities, there are other communities that fix reflection. There are all sorts of gurus, coaches who fix reflection.
But in a situation of extreme threat, reflection without thinking does not work. Why? Here, it seemed, you were given a reflection. You take the ultimate situation - the use of nuclear weapons. And it does not work without thinking. Because it is purely reflexive, purely uplifting, without thinking, you have to adjust all the changes in this situation with your thinking: how people think, how they will think. There is such a feature.
The vast majority of people do not act in a limiting situation in the way that they could act. Well, imagine how you will act when they come up to you with a knife and say: give me money or we will stab you. That is, the vast majority of people do not know how they will act in this situation.
Limiting situations are not solved in a reflexive way - only by thinking. You must mentally build many moves, change many of your ideas in order to simply reach the possibility of reflection in this situation. That is, in extreme situations, reflection without thinking does not work.
Coming back to your first question. This is an understanding, if we had an understanding somewhere, in this place it is not just necessary to build reflective models, but mental-reflexive models. And this means that you should have not one group, but several groups competing with each other, which are the bearers of such a concept, such models, this one, another, third, fifth, tenth. And only in their communication, mentally constructing different scenarios, we will find two or three reflexive models where Ukraine could somehow win.
I tell you, as a result of heavy building of various models, I have not seen a single scenario in which Ukraine wins. Not like when using strategic, when using tactical and even conventional weapons with aviation. None.
What is your understanding of victory?
That, in my understanding, victory is when you reach a situation better than before. here is a victory in the Caribbean crisis - this is when the situation after is better than the situation before. That is, they said in the USSR: parity must be maintained. If you delivered missiles to us in Turkey, we have a flight time, and we had the right to Cuba. Because sorry, you violated parity, you were the first to violate. And the Americans agreed to take them away.
Clarifying question. Finland in 1945. When the defeat of Nazi Germany takes place, and Finland, as an ally of Germany, is under the threat of invasion from the USSR. But it avoids this by ceding territories that were lost in the war of 1939-1940.
Accordingly, is it a victory or not? To me, this is a win. Because the situation is worse than before 1939, but let's consider the fact that it could be occupied...
Yura, you have described it brilliantly. It made a strategic move. That is, Finland bought its independence in exchange for territories.
Now let's look at our situation. Whom does Crimea belong to? Inside Ukraine, it is ours. Whom does Donbas belong to? Inside Ukraine, it is ours. That is, did we act like Finland? We have created a situation of uncertainty. Contradictory uncertainty. We do not bargain with Russia. Well, if you want it this way - Crimea is yours, Donbas is yours - that's it. Our independence is more important. We sign - you no longer attack.
Have we done so? Have we acted like Finland? No, we hung up the situation, drove everything into uncertainty to the utmost, abandoned reflection and thinking, wrote down stupid expressions in the constitution like we are going to the EU and NATO, and we think that it somehow works... Show me at least one scenario in which it all works. Just write me a script when it works.
And if there is no script, what the hell? What the hell are you straining and actually creating a nuclear war in the world? We are literally on the rampage right now. Because there are two alternatively gifted - that is, Putin and our Ukrainian president. One says give us guarantees that Ukraine will not be in NATO, and another one says give us guarantees that Ukraine will be in NATO. Well, what is it? It's s kind of kindergarten.
Well, there must be someone who would explain to the children that matches are not a toy. At least one person, come and say: kids, stop messing around, matches are not a toy. Explain. It doesn’t work on reflexive models - well, somehow explain to them on your fingers.
Well, I live in this country, I can't get through to anyone. Because, well, how do you get through? You start speaking this language with a person, showing reflexive models, and he tells you something like “but we will be independent, we will have a language, vyshyvanka and Bandera”. And what else can we talk about?
The biggest threat of nationalism is not that it is for the nation, not that it is for language, but that it provides simple answers to complex questions. Refusal of thinking is the biggest threat of nationalism.
Tell me, did Ukraine win World War II? I'm asking a simple question. Sometimes I have such conversations with nationalists. Did Ukraine win World War II?
Whom did we defeat?
So, let's figure it out.
Ukraine was among the founders of the UN.
Wait a second, let's take a look at this situation. Soviet Ukraine defeated Nazi Germany. Are we the heirs of Soviet Ukraine?
Who said that? Where did you see in our documents that we are the heirs of Soviet Ukraine? We are not. We carried out decommunization, and we believe that the Soviet past is our colonial defeat.
I mean de facto.
And if you look at the Ukrainian Wikipedia, it says the following, that the victory of Ukraine in World War II was important for the creation of the Ukrainian national state. Think about it, Nazi Germany, the Ukrainian nation-state. Just to be clear.
The difference between Nazism and nationalism is one warm, the other is hotter. I understand that when there is water, there is ice; when there is water, there is steam. But the difference between warm and hot water is a subjective, instrumental thing. A little more than that, a little less than that, you know.
Therefore, the national state of Ukraine was defeated in World War II. Soviet Ukraine won. We cannot accept the victory of the Soviet Ukraine, because our current attitudes and orientations are fundamentally different. Victory does not pass automatically.
Once again I ask the question - so whom did we defeat in World War II? We, as the national state of Ukraine, whom did we defeat? We didn't win - we got defeated.
You see, therefore, in answering your question, I think, we should include Soviet Ukraine and the Russian Empire into our history. Because otherwise our history turns into just three flashes: flash - abyss, flash - abyss, flash - abyss.
Yes. Kievan Rus, Kozachchina, 1917-1921, a little bit before the defeat of Petlyura - and that's it.
Yes. And if we do not include other periods, we have ...
We have nothing.
And we can't draw any conclusions from what happened. Because this is not ours, and what is not ours, we deny.
Look, again, back to your first question. But this is understanding, where should it grow? That is, we must fix somewhere who we are? Are we a nation state, or maybe a diverse state? Or a humanitarian state? Or are we a civilization? Or maybe we are all mankind? We must ask ourselves these questions. Because in one case we won the Second World War, in the second case we did not win the Second World War.
And then, who did we defeat? Did we defeat the Soviet Union? So we didn't win. Did they defeat Nazi Germany? So we, in general, by and large, if we are a national state, we did not fight with it. These questions arise, and the answers to them are not simple - they are complex. But they are impossible within a national ideology, be it ethnic or political.
And in this sense, only the reflexive model works here too. If you want to build a coherent story that students can understand, you must build a reflective model of that story.
Because I was taught that the path “from the Varangians to the Greeks” was an important thing on which Kievan Rus arose. Then young Tolochko appears and says: well, yes, the path “from the Varangians to the Greeks” was the path of the slave trade.
Fuck… So it turns out that I am a descendant of slavers? And I really wanted to be a heir to some honest, good, ancestors. I knew the path “from the Varangians to the Greeks,” and this turns out to be such a shit.
Because you didn't ask the question. The path "from the Varangians to the Greeks", what was transported along it.
No, a lot of things were transported, but what was the most important commodity. What was the most important commodity there? And so, you understand, and these simple answers to complex questions, they are, as it were, in history step by step.
And so, when you say that we should have understanding, I return to this question again and again - who should understand? Where should this understanding be recorded? At what level of reflection (and most importantly of thinking) should this be recorded? What is the unit of this understanding? Where are these reflective models presented?
Okay, you can't say publicly that we'll join NATO, we won't join NATO - we won't win. But at least gather a narrow circle of people who at least understand this conversation.
I sometimes watch "Black Square" by Vadim Karasev, I listen to both our diplomats and experts. It's impossible to perceive. These people say nonsense. Moreover, on the basis of this nonsense, they are trying to build a geopolitical strategy.
I'm folding my hands. I live in this state! It will hit me, but I can’t do anything! Because look who you have to deal with!
And now I don't know what to do in this situation. I can't change anything.
Now watch. And I'll tell you what to do.
What can be done?
We must create, without waiting for the actions of the state, we must launch a movement (and this will begin now, I think) about the defense of the state in the broadest sense. And on the one hand, it is necessary to start asking these questions to Zelensky. Let's say yesterday Yermak declares...
I ask, but Zelensky does not need to ask any questions.
Wait. Yesterday, Yermak said that 90% of Ukrainians are ready to defend independence. Well, ask a question - if 90% are ready to fall behind, then where do we have the Territorial Defense exercises? Where do we have elementary answers to questions? Here we are now sitting in the studio, the center of Kyiv - where is the nearest bomb shelter? So that people just know where to run.
Since 2014, I want to… I have been trying to achieve one thing since 2014 – so that, in the event of a threat of war, the deputies do not leave for the New Year on vacation. I'm trying, I'm asking them a question point-blank: tell me, since Putin ante portae, Putin is at the gate, maybe you won't go anywhere? But they say they bought the tickets. I do not understand this!
Let it be so with territorial defense. But can we ensure that the deputies do not go on vacation? I can't get it. I explain to them anyway, and I'm explaining to them but they answer - "war is war, and vacation is vacation".
This, you know, I imagine the year 216 BC, after the battle of Cannae, some kind of Scipio sits at dinner, some family comes and says: what are you going to do? Well, we'll go to Capua now, or Capri, somewhere there. Let's sit and eat fruit. And how are you? Oh, is Hannibal coming? Let him go. The war will be long and hard, there is no hurry.
We have one politician who responded to the arrest like that - I'm on vacation. I'll be back, I can still do it.
He comes back on January 17th. From vacation.
And in this sense, I do not know where to grow this understanding. So you say that there is a community that already wants to begin to understand. Okay, let's say I'm ready to believe it. But I don't understand. They say that the Cabinet of Ministers works inefficiently there - it works inefficiently. The Institute for Strategic Studies is not working effectively - well, perhaps. The Institute of National Remembrance is not working well - well, perhaps it isn't.
Okay, we are so young, new faces, awesome, we made the Office of the President, he does everything instead of all of them. Well, where - show me! Prove to me on at least one reflexive model that we are winning. Now, if so and so and so and so, and these are the decisions, we win. I just don't see any attempt to do so.
I do not see any attempts to do ordinary intellectual thought-reflexive work. Okay, territorial defense. It's just laxity and disorganization. This is just what I can understand. Well, there are in general intellectuals, they are, as it were, generally accustomed to working with something. Give them a task - they will begin to think it over, even regardless of where they are at that moment. But these same questions must be asked. Tasks are set, these tasks are cut.
Nobody builds any strategies. This is the nonsense that was drawn with the attack, these arrows ... As I looked, I already lost my mind. Do you remember, they drew arrows, how Putin will attack usthere. Okay, it's clear that this is for public use. But what does it all really look like? Here if to argue.
Maybe we don't need this Territorial Defense? Maybe we'll do it differently? Maybe Territorial Defense is effective in a completely different type of war? That is, not with machine guns in hand to resist, but to think about how to reserve communications, how to build the independence of digital control. These are the things to think about. Does anyone actually do this or not?
Therefore, I do not understand, to be honest, how this can be done at all. There is intellectual potential, there are people who think about it. On the other hand, there would be those people who could act as customers, directors of those tasks. But that doesn't happen. Even on the eve of the war.
That is, the best thing that we came up with is to shift from a sick head to a healthy one, so let America do it. This is not the business of Ukraine at all. America has a problem with Russia. Well, yes, the troops are on the border with Ukraine, but this is not a problem for Ukraine - this is an American problem.
And we, therefore, took popcorn, sat in the front rows and watched how Putin negotiated with Biden. They tell us: guys, it's all about you, it's all about you, you'll have a war. Yes, but we are looking at how they will agree there, and then we will ...
Let's return to it after holidays!
Let's unfold Territorial Defense after holidays! After holidays!
That is, I have a skeptical attitude to, first of all, to the intellectual provision of authorities, to strategic incompetence, and to the inability to generally think through my geopolitical orientations for decades. I would like to hear something more significant than "let's do it this way, and something will happen" from the supporters of writing into the constitution the EU and NATO.
Because "something will happen" does not convince me. I need something more serious. Reflective models, you know, conceptual support, theories, deployment scenarios. I need all these things, but I just can't find them.
Arestovich will be here now, and I will ask him these questions.
And he will say that somewhere in the depths of the General Staff, in such deep cabinets, there are these fucking ingenious strategies, which, if they are used, then we win at once with a big score.
Yes. That is, absolutely. Therefore, if you can, please, convey to him my skepticism about this. And now I would just like to understand where this knowledge should grow, who will grow it, and with what efforts. Because I honestly don't understand lately.
We will answer Datsyuk's serious questions. Because I believe that we really have a moment of truth. Everything is rotten, everything in such a lax form it cannot exist. Just objectively. And so we must answer this.
If the government does not give it (and it will not give it, I'm just sure), then the society that we have developed is somehow flimsy. I just talk to a lot of people, they ask these questions and they want to take action. And they will act.
I'd rather think a little before acting.
Because we have already acted. Many people think that the inclusion in the constitution of the EU and NATO is an action.
Yes, and therefore, including the action, it begins with asking such questions so that we do not find that we have run somewhere, and then we do not know what to do. Questions should be asked before you start doing something.
Thanks to Serhiy Datsyuk.