In Ukraine, there is a very simplified understanding of war as a concept and a very simplified understanding of the threats in the war with Russia. In the context of the current media noise about the impending military escalation and the "fresh" reports of the Bild and The Washington Post about "a ready-made invasion plan on Putin's table", all media are going mad about "airstrikes", "sieage of Odessa", "captures of Kyiv" and a new line "along the Zbruch".
As the German edition of Bild sees a large-scale war between Russia and Ukraine
War is a special way of achieving the basic goals of one state in relation to another, which is considered an enemy. The methods that can be used to achieve these goals vary. These are methods of economic influence, methods of political and diplomatic, humanitarian (science, culture, sports), information (including the Internet), religious and military.
As the American edition of The Washington Post sees a large-scale war between Russia and Ukraine
All of the above is called a "complex of measures of national influence" of one country on another to achieve basic goals in the war. There is no "hybridity" that people love to talk about and write about. There is "complexity". This is the interpretation of modern war by the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Valery Gerasimov, reflected in the military doctrine of Russia.
So, this is the point of view of the general staff of the country with which we are allegedly at war. Therefore, I consider it important for understanding and rethinking. To achieve the basic goals of the war that we are starting, the state and public institutions of the country must act in an integrated manner and complement each other.
Only in this case can the goals of the war be achieved in full (given) scope. In other words, victory is achieved, and the enemy is placed in such conditions in which he is forced to surrender - that is, to fulfill the demands of the winner.
If a state system in a state of war for some reason ignores one of the "measures of national influence", the result of the war can be either intermediate (incomplete), or in general - to put the belligerent country in the format of defeat, economic and, as a result, political costs. Up to the elimination of statehood.
The war between state models, purely technically, can be of only two characters, no matter how historians and political scientists substantiate the reasons for their occurrence, we will not fantasize. A war has either economic or humanitarian nature.
An economic war is a war for resources that strengthen / weaken the model and give / prevent it from strengthening / weakening its potential and strengthening / weakening the possibilities of geoeconomic and geopolitical influence.
As a rule, an economic war does not set itself the goal of completely destroying the enemy, but only weakening it. As a rule, an economic war ends with a redistribution of spheres of influence and a restart of the regional or world landscape of geopolitics. The end of an economic war means preparations for a new war of the same type.
War - of a humanitarian nature - is a war for identity, when the basic goal of a war is the destruction or absorption of an enemy state model, since its very existence in the form in which a war arises threatens the possibility of the successful existence of our state model.
Not always and not in all cases, the destruction of the enemy state model means the destruction of an ethnos. Ethnic groups, especially naturally antisystemic ones, may exist within the boundaries of state models, in which they may not be titular and will not directly influence the domestic political agenda. As a rule, a humanitarian war destroys a weaker state model and its territory becomes absorbed by the victor, which does not at all mean in some future the possibility of revenge and attempts by the conquered to restore statehood at the expense of various objective, historical factors, if they, of course, take place.
I will try (although it is difficult) to mention two important factors briefly, the importance of which we pay very little attention to or generally - prefer not to mention them. These are factors - readiness for war and understanding of why we / they are fighting.
Readiness for war is the creation by the military-political leadership of the state model of a certain scheme of public consciousness and worldview, in which the outbreak of war and the war itself in society is understood not as a catastrophe, but as a realized necessity for the survival of the state model as a whole. The readiness for war consolidates the elites and society, directing their resource energy towards the realization of the basic goal in the war. Politicians are more successful in preparing their people for war, who think in complex categories and are able to build long chains of strategomes, thanks to which the basic goal of the war will be achieved.
Understanding why we are fighting is a very important factor, since it involves violence against the main human instinct - the instinct of self-preservation, which, in the format of the transition from peace to war, can become a social barrier that prevents the state model from being prepared for war and, as a result, to fail basic goals for the entire government model. When I talk about the instinct of self-preservation - this is a broader concept than the fear of death or the loss of loved ones.
The instinct of social self-preservation is a non-illusory opportunity to lose the usual, everyday biorhythm of a person's life (!) In peacetime (!), which in one form or another will be changed to a military one, depending on the nature of the war. To overcome this barrier, the military-political leadership of the state model is obliged to give society a vivid and practically tangible picture of the world order - after the war, in which every individual of the country will "see" his specific place "at the moment of victory" and will clearly understand what exactly ( !) for him (!) the world after the war in ITS STATE MODEL will be BETTER (!) than before it began.
Without the implementation of these two important, in my opinion, factors, the war of any state model will be doomed to capitulation and defeat.
Unfortunately, Ukraine and Russia have a humanitarian war. That is, a war for identity. When I wrote at the beginning of the text that we have a simplified understanding of the threats in the war with Russia, I meant that the war with this country, as a phenomenon, in our public consciousness is "understood" only in one of its manifestations or "measure of national impact "- in the military, which Russia in a very" limited "form used and continues to use" somewhere far away "in the east of our country, killing our citizens.
In addition to other, no less important measures of warfare, yes, there is also a military one.
It is special.
This measure, for many reasons, is special for any country, since it involves the massacre of citizens of an enemy country and the destruction of its infrastructure with the help of the army, which is technically a state institution that can do it professionally. From the position of the layman, namely, the layman is the backbone of any state model - "military measure" - a manifestation of the War, which, by the way, very quickly can appear "from the east" directly to "your home" - is the most terrible, since its impact on the enemy most quickly reveals the true level:
- readiness for war
- understanding why we are fighting
If the military-political leadership and the majority in society of a specific state model do not understand the importance of these two factors, and even more so, if the elites of this country do not have any basic goals in the war except for the slogan "get rid of us" - I hasten to please you all - and this state model and its public consciousness have very big problems both with the very understanding of the War and with its results. This is the first thing.
Russia has been waging a war against Ukraine for a long time. And this is not only eight years of the ongoing "low intensity" positional conflict in Donbass after the occupation of Crimea, where Moscow uses the "military measure" of war. The Kremlin began its war with Ukraine for identity immediately after Ukraine's declaration of independence in 1991. So, literally the next day, since the return of Ukraine to the empire corresponded, corresponds and will correspond to the basic goals of Moscow, regardless of who is in the Kremlin today. The measures of war that the Russians have been using for 30 years can change and be combined, but not the war itself, since it can end only upon reaching the basic goal - the absorption of the entire territory of Ukraine. This is the second.
Russia is a continental empire, whose successful existence is based not on the principle of social or material well-being of its subjects, but on the principle of constant expansion and expansion of its territory, especially at the expense of those territories that (nota bene!) are in the public consciousness of the Russian people and its elites are only "temporarily lost" due to the weakening of the internal vertical of power in the late 1980s, when the "Soviet modification" lost its effectiveness. It may seem wild or grotesque now, but this is a reality that we have to deal with and which is not something that is not spoken out by many "experts" in our country, but is not even realized. Not to mention the society as a whole.
When I talk about the "Soviet modification" of the Russian empire, there is, by the way, no reservation whatsoever. Russian imperial chauvinist and Ukrainophobe Vitaly Shulgin, who was a deputy of the State Duma under the tsar, accepted his abdication in the train, then did not accept Soviet authorities, was in the white movement, lived in exile, then, after the war, captured in Yugoslavia and passed the Stalinist camps, having lived right up to 1976, wrote that
"... our ideas jumped over the front ... they (the Bolsheviks) restored the Russian army ... It may seem crazy, but it is so ... The Bolsheviks actually raised the banner of United Russia ... in fact, the Internationale turned out to be an instrument ... for expanding the territory ... for the authorities sitting in Moscow ... one cannot but see that the Russian language, for the glory of the Internationale, again occupied one sixth of the land ... the Bolsheviks: 1) restore the military might of Russia; 2) restore the borders of the Russian state ... 3) prepare the coming of the all-Russian autocrat ... "(c)
- Shulgin V. V. "Years. Days - 1920".
And after the Stalinist camps, Shulgin did not abandon his firm conviction that the USSR was the same Russian Empire, but only in a new guise.
In Bolshevism and monarchism, Shulgin generally saw many similar features - rejection of parliamentarism, strong dictatorial power, etc.
"... there is only one leap from here to the Tsar," wrote Shulgin about the Bolsheviks back in December 1917. Shulgin credited the Russian Bolsheviks with the fact that they had actually restored the "normal" organization of society - they had affirmed inequality and the principle of one-man command, placing a new elite over the Russian people - the Bolshevik Party, headed by the sole ruler - the leader.
The historian Agursky in his work "Ideology of National Bolshevism" wrote that Shulgin was, by the way, the first who drew attention to the fact that the Bolsheviks, on an unconscious level, took national Russian positions, using the ideas of the Internationale as an instrument of Russian national policy ...
Returning to the theme of war - Russian "national policy", in other words, consists in the constant expansion of its "authentic" territory and constant export of its principle of "iron" national "one-man command" to the space to which it can be exported by all "measures of national influence" ... Surkov called this in his article "the export of chaos." Let's not argue about the terminology with the ideologue of the "hybrid war" in the Donbas.
This constant “export” of its system of “values” and its “worldview” is a long-term basic goal of Moscow, no matter how “irrational” it may seem to “experts” and other “rational” TV “experts”. That, in fact, is what Putin is doing now, as a faithful follower of Soviet secretaries general, emperors and all Moscow tsars.
Physiologically, Putin views Ukraine only through the prism of the territory conquered at the end of the 17th century, inhabited by "polonized Russians", which must be returned, and it is in this context that the Russian elites and Russian society view Ukraine. The war for Ukraine is going on not only in the present, it is also going on in the past. "Return", because - this corresponds to the basic "irrational" goal - the export of chaos in the name (!) of the survival of the Russian state model as a whole (!). This is both - the readiness for war and the rationale for what THEY, as a state model, are fighting for.
Until 2014, Moscow fought for real with independent Ukraine, and Ukraine simply did not realize this. Until 2014, Moscow fought with Ukraine on the stage and on television, in churches and on the pages of books, by bribing our politicians and using gas schemes, in the cinema and in the sales markets, by creating certain conditions for a good life for our oligarchs and the impoverishment of Ukrainians, with the help of gas and meat and milk wars, with the help of the regular organization of foreign policy discrediting our country, and Ukraine did not know this, and the Ukrainian sleepy society and our stupid and greedy "elite" did not understand (and do not understand) that they are waging a real war with them until, in the final phase of the war, Putin began to use military "measure" in the war.
The use of military "measures" frustrated "veils" for some (not all) in the Ukrainian society, it became apparent that Moscow went to war against us. If Putin did not commit the occupation of the Crimea and aggression in the Donbas in 2014, and continued to use non-military measures of warfare, I assure you, we would still be in blissful ignorance.
Now closer to the current media warnings and about the threat of a possible large-scale invasion of the armies of the Russian Federation and satellite Belarus into the territory of Ukraine with "plans on Putin's table" and the destruction of Ukraine as a state model. As we have already determined with you, in a war there are basic goals and measures to achieve these goals. The basic goal of the Kremlin is known - the absorption of Ukraine. No more and no less. There are two factors - the readiness for war and - the understanding of what the war is being fought for. Based on the existing reality (and not illusions), we draw conclusions:
The war against Ukraine, as a state model, has been waged by Russia for about 30 years with the use of all available "measures of national influence." Out of thirty years of war, for eight years Russia, in a very limited form, has been using military measure, without diminishing the active use of other measures, including economic, religious, informational, cultural and political-diplomatic ones. I will not dwell on the gas and energy segment, as it fits into the economic measure of warfare, which Moscow uses as effectively as the mortar attacks in our Donbas. This is the first thing.
Second. Neither the “elite” in Ukraine nor the public, largely postcolonial consciousness of Ukrainians, with the exception of those who have gone through hostilities and a small number of critically thinking people, are aware of the true scale of the actions, efforts and resources that the Kremlin has used and is using to destroy the Ukrainian statehood.
Why the government and our "elite" in Ukraine do not communicate with society on such an important issue as the survival of the state model, I think, is understandable. Why we are not waging an information war, looking at the current OP, too, I think it is clear (if there is no fucking war, then there is no informational war, respectively). We lost it without starting.
In the mass consciousness of the Ukrainian people in the street, Russia “is not at war with Ukraine,” since “we trade,” “we decide everything,” “politicians quarreled us,” “once lived together,” and other soothing narratives that are actively supported by the powerful “fifth column” and Russian information troops. If we do not want and "do not wage" a war, we do not perceive it as a complex concept, therefore we do not use all "measures of national influence" to solve "basic goals" that we do not have, except for "see us", which visualized by Ukraine's limited use of military measure. This is the third.
The Kremlin, inflicting a local military defeat on the Ukrainian armed forces in 2014 and 2015, which led to the signing of both "Minsk", wants from the Ukrainian oligarchs and their "political" puppets a public complete political surrender and only according to the "scenario" that is beneficial to Moscow, because the Kremlin considers their negotiating positions to be stronger than the negotiating positions of Ukraine. "Minsk" - from the point of view of Putin - is a tool for the collapse of Ukraine from within. Without high human losses for the Russian army. Technically, it looks like this. No matter how cynical it is for those reading these lines.
In order to obtain a stronger negotiating position, Ukraine, as a state model, needs to apply its own "measures of national influence" on the Russian Federation. It is impossible to get a "direct conversation" with Putin about peace in the current system of political coordinates. Only surrender. Moreover, given the current bastard state of Ukrainian diplomacy, it is quite possible that the "Western partners" will also beg for the surrender of Ukraine in order to "turn away the war in Europe". Including grandfather Biden. This is the fourth.
Russia has concentrated and continues to concentrate troops near our borders.
Now I will not go into "invasion dates", "rivets", count Russian battalion-tactical groups around the borders, draw "arrows", talk about cruise missiles and tell you about the level of rearmament of the Russian troops. Without me now, on any media platform, there are enough "military experts" who will scare you with the place "where the Russian army can reach."
Can Putin give an order to expand the military measure of "influence" on our territory, which is located outside the demarcation line in Donbas? Technically, he can. If the increase in the military grade in the Kremlin is considered beneficial for solving the basic goal in the war, this will be done immediately. Let you have no doubts that if they need, Russian planes and ballistic missiles will turn any of the Ukrainian cities into Aleppo.
In big geopolitics, unfortunately, there is no room for moral and ethical reflections, because the stakes in this war for Moscow and for Putin personally are very high. The place, method and current date of the expansion of hostilities are usually masked by the military. Including, by the way, and information noise, which is skillfully fueled by the Russian information and political-diplomatic component.
Therefore, it is possible to guess about the level and directions of the "offensives" on the "maps" from the Bild and The Washington Post, but personally I do not see much practical sense in this. As, in fact, I do not see the point in funny conversations about "partisanship" and our other beloved "Koliivshchyna" (a major rebellion that broke out in the Right-bank Ukraine in June 1768 - ed.). Any, even the most passionate anti-systemic protest looks beautiful only at the level of "talk" about it, in reality, in one form or another, it loses to the systemic influence. Including the influence of the regular army.
In war, as a concept, the decisive factor is not the number of tanks, "bayraktars" or "Jewelins", not the level of training of the Air Force or the number of ships, and not even the amount of manpower that the state model can mobilize to physically eliminate the enemy's carcasses.
There are only two decisive factors of war, including the use of military measures, as we have already discussed - readiness for war and understanding of what we are fighting for as a state model.
Either victory or defeat is born from the success of these two factors.